WORKSHOP:
CONSCIOUS CREATURES - CONSCIOUS STATES
Jakob Hohwy (Monash University)
title: What is the role of creature consciousness in a model of consciousness?
time: 10.10 am - 10.50 am
Abstract. Much of the empirical evidence amassed in the search for the neural correlates of conscious states can be unified in an explanatory model inspired by the computationalist idea that the brain is an organ for predicting its sensory input. However, as a model of consciousness, it has the very serious problem that it isn’t about what it takes for a mental state to be conscious. Instead it focuses on which representational states happen to be selected for conscious presentation in a creature that the model presupposes is conscious. In response, one could try to incorporate the neural correlates of creature consciousness into the model. This immediately makes the model less explanatory since we don’t know the contribution of this new element. The underlying problem is that in searching for the neural correlates of creature consciousness as such, in isolation from particular conscious states, one works on the dubious presupposition that there are two distinct properties of being conscious, being creature conscious and being state conscious.
Tim Bayne (Oxford University)
title: Building blocks vs. the unified field: How does the structure of consciousness constrain its explanation?
11 am - 11.40 am
Abstract. Following Searle, we can distinguish two conceptions of the structure of consciousness: the building block model and the unified field model. According to the building block model, the creature’s overall conscious state (at a time) is generated by the fact that the creature has a number of particular (fine-grained) conscious states, which are bound together to form a single total conscious state. According to the unified field model, the creature’s overall conscious state is generated by various contents feeding into a single unified field. Unlike the building block model, the unified field model need not posit any binding mechanism responsible for unifying fine-grained conscious states together. I present some reasons for favouring the unified field model, and then draw some methodological implications from the discussion.
Chris Frith (Aarhus University & University College London)
title: Are there different neural correlates for different aspects of consciousness?
time: Noon - 12:40 pm
Can we use measures of brain activity to answer questions about consciousness? I shall consider two such questions. The first question is easy to answer: Is this creature conscious of X? From lesion and brain imaging studies we have identified locations in the brain (critical nodes) that are necessary for particular kinds of conscious experience. For example, the area in the inferior temporal cortex known as V4 is necessary for the experience of colour. However, activity in this area is not sufficient for consciousness of colour: activity in parietal and frontal cortex seems to be needed as well, probably mediated via the thalamus. The second question is much more difficulty to answer: Is this creature conscious? The question tends to be reformulated as Is this creature conscious of anything? People in deep sleep still show brain activity in response to stimuli, but thalamic mediation of sensory areas with frontal cortex seems to be reduced. The most critical cases are provided by patients in the persistent vegetative state. These patients are conscious in the sense of going through a sleep wake cycle, but don’t seem to be conscious of anything. Can we use brain imaging technology to discover if such a patient is conscious, but unable to transmit any behavioural signs of consciousness?
JANUARY 22ND 2008
ABSTRACTS
place: TBA, AARHUS, DENMARK
time: 10 am -4 pm
date: january 22nd
